Issues: Below the Surface
Building subs in Taiwan is only superficially a good idea
Building subs in Taiwan is only superficially a good idea
Four U.S. defense contractors are set to present proposals this spring for the construction of the eight diesel-electric submarines that the Bush Administration authorized in 2001 as warranted for Taiwan's defense. But the issue has been complicated by growing pressure from the Legislative Yuan to have a portion of the vessels built in Taiwan (presumably under the supervision of the American company that wins the bid, though whether the company would accept the liability for vessels it didn't make itself is another question). Besides a desire to upgrade Taiwan's capability and degree of self-reliance in manufacturing advanced weaponry, the motivation for construction in Taiwan includes the wish to bring much-needed business to the troubled state-owned China Shipbuilding Corp. (CSBC).
As worthy as those aims might be, experts in the field point out the numerous difficulties Taiwan would be likely to encounter if it decides the submarine construction should be done at home. CSBC would need to develop its submarine-building capability from scratch. Putting in place the necessary technical infrastructure (including sophisticated testing facilities) plus training of skilled personnel would add substantially to the cost of the project -- a heavy burden at a time when Taiwan has a long list of military procurement needs but faces a constricted budget. Such preparation would also be time-consuming, delaying by at least several years (and probably longer) the date when the subs could actually be operational.
Even more worrisome is the risk that the project could be disrupted at any time by pressure from Beijing on foreign governments and vendors. If the construction takes places at CSBC, Taiwan would be directly dependent on overseas supply chains for vital materials, parts, and equipment. That kind of vulnerability to political interference from the PRC would be mitigated if the construction were done by American companies in American yards.
A more realistic approach would be for Taiwan to use the opportunity of working closely with the U.S. contractor to gradually build up its experience and expertise with submarines. Once its personnel are trained in the U.S. shipyards during the construction phase, for example, CSBC could take on the heavy responsibility (and highly profitable activity) of maintenance of the underwater craft.
